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Bob Jessop 
 
This article explores depoliticization in relation to the three domains of polity, 
politics, and policy, distinguishing its different meanings in these three 
contexts, identifying different strategies of depoliticization corresponding to 
each domain, and exploring their interconnections. Politicisation and 
repoliticization can be explored in the same manner. The analysis is 
illustrated from the strategies of depoliticization pursued in relation to the 
fiscal cliff debate in the USA and the constitutionalization of the Fiscal 
Compact in the Eurozone, Some general conclusions are also offered. 
 





Politicisation, depoliticization, and repoliticization are basic and interrelated concepts 
in political analysis. They may also describe specific political strategies in relatively 
stable, turbulent or crisis-prone periods or concrete conjunctures. This article aims to 
clarify the chameleon-like concept of depoliticization by distinguishing its different 
levels and forms. It also applies these distinctions to two cases of ‘depoliticization’ in 
the fiscal politics of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC). The magnitude, 
duration, and depth of this crisis have prompted an intriguing mix of de- and re-
politicisation strategies. These are evident in the manufactured hysteria about the 
‘fiscal cliff’ in the USA and the attempts to impose technocratic government and a 
new economic constitution in the Eurozone. The conclusion offers some general 
reflections. 
 
‘Depoliticization’ and cognate concepts need disambiguation. Relevant questions 
include whether these processes are intended outcomes of deliberate action or 
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unintended, possibly unacknowledged, effects of societal trends, other processes, or 
practices with other goals. Depoliticization is also a relational term: it demands 
specific reference points in past and present political space-time against which to 
establish its occurrence. This means that politics and, a fortiori, politicization are 
polyvalent, context-dependent concepts. As Kari Palonen notes: 
 
There are no naturally political questions, but only questions that have been 
politicized. Issues arise only in response to moves or processes of 
politicization, and only when they are thematized as contingent and 
controversial topics. Each of them has its own different temporal layers and 
contextual indexes that indicate when, how, and where they have become 
politicized. We may always ask whether they still carry any kind of political 
weight in a current situation, or whether they have been devaluated in favor 
of more recently politicized questions (2005: 44). 
 
Recognizing this polyvalence helps to avoid three theoretical and analytical pitfalls: 
 
(1) A pan-politicism that conflates politics and power, sees them everywhere, 
denies the specificity of the political field, and treats depoliticization as a mere 
change in the mode in which and/or site where [political] power operates. This 
can be avoided by specifying a referent for politics, e.g., open class conflict, 
political partisanship, issues falling within the authority of a territorial state, 
decisions made by those with official roles in a given political sphere, and so 
on. 
(2) A sur-politicisme (overly political interpretation of politics) that adopts a broad 
definition of politics, restricts the scope of its ‘other(s)’, and so limits the space 
for politicization. However, if one sees the demarcation between the political 
and non-political as meta-political, then re- and de-politicization can be 
defined as equivalent meta-political acts despite their substantive differences. 
(3) A crypto-normativity that treats one form of politics as genuine and others as 
inauthentic. Examples include the equation of politics with an antagonistic 
friend-enemy politics (Schmitt 1993), an agonistic politics of disagreement 
oriented to reaching and revising consensus on the common good (Rancière 
2005, Mouffe 2000), a mode of freedom opposed to the state’s police power 
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(Arendt 1960, Castoriadis 1991), the technocratic administration of things 
(utilitarianism), and so on. 
 
To move beyond these pitfalls one can build on the well-known distinction between 
polity, politics, and policy (e.g., Heidenheimer 1986, and, for global politics, Lipschutz 
2005). This conceptual triplet can be read as highlighting the ontological depth of the 
political and, hence, different levels where depoliticization occurs; or, following 
Palonen (2000), as indicating changed meanings over centuries of the concept of the 
political. Choosing the first reading, I consider the entanglement of three levels of 
depoliticization. The constitution of the polity (constitutive politics) affects unevenly 
capacities to engage in politics (to influence, as Lasswell (1936) put it, ‘who gets 
what when and how’) and this in turn constrains the range of feasible policies (policy-
making as an art of the possible). Yet some policies transform constitutive politics 
(witness the depoliticizing aim of neoliberal policies or the politicizing effects of the 
feminist claim that the personal is political) and reshape political practices (e.g., 
changing the balance of forces and stimulating new political claims and movements). 
 
Polity (from the Greek politeia) is a spatial concept. It contrasts the sphere of society 
in which political activities occur with other, non-political spheres, such as religion, 
the economy, law, education, or science. Relevant spatial metaphors here include: 
sphere, domain, realm, field, area, arena, stage, scene, and site (Palonen 2000). 
‘Polity’ covers the institutional architecture of the political field, including its 
boundaries and boundary-maintenance vis-à-vis non-political spheres, and the 
asymmetric effects of this architecture on political practice. Key issues include the 
institutional specificity of the polity (its disembedding from society and/or its 
particularization vis-à-vis other institutional orders), the separation of powers, the 
distinctiveness of political rationality and calculation, the structuring of the political 
field in normal states and exceptional regimes, differences among these regimes, 
and issues of scale (e.g., parish government vs global governance). 
 
Politics refers to formally instituted, organized or informal practices that are directly 
oriented to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power. In contrast to the 
presumed relative stability of the polity as an instituted space, politics refers to 
dynamic, contingent activities that take time. They may occur within the formal 
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political sphere, at its margins, or beyond it. Relevant political activities range from 
practices to transform the scope of the political sphere, define the state’s nature and 
purposes, modify the institutional integration and operating unity of the state, 
exercise direct control over the use of state powers, influence the balance of forces 
inside the state, block or resist the exercise of state power from ‘outside’, or modify 
the wider balance of forces that shapes politics as the art of the possible. Key issues 
include the forces involved in different political activities, which issues get thematized 
as legitimate topics of state action and political mobilization, who defines the 
conditions for declaring a state of exception, and shifts in the political conjuncture. 
 
Policy concerns the overall strategic line of the state, the changing responsibilities of 
branches and tiers of government, specific modes and fields of state intervention and 
non-intervention, the aims and content of particular decisions and non-decisions, and 
so on. All three Ps have institutional (structural) and practical (strategic) features that 
also interact (on the underlying approach that informs this analysis, see Jessop 
2002, 2007). The following remarks explore re- and de-politicization at each level of 
analysis and their interactions. Table 1 summarizes these remarks. 
 
Depolitization and the Polity 
 
The identity of the polity involves material and discursive boundaries between the 
state qua institutional ensemble and other institutional orders or ‘civil society’. At 
stake is the construction of the political sphere as the reference point for political 
projects and activities. The ‘public-private’ distinction is a key, socially constituted 
dividing line here but is also problematic (e.g., the claim that the personal is political). 
Polities are nonetheless articulated to other institutional orders, civil society, and 
informal social practices. 
 
For example, from an institutionalist perspective, Mitchell proposes: 
 
[t]he state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision 
and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally 
divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies 
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formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but 
the producing and reproducing of this line of difference (1991: 95). 
 
These processes also divide the globe into different states and societies, creating a 
segmented and stratified inter-state system in an emerging world society. This is 
more complicated than suggested by conventional accounts of the traditional 
Westphalian national territorial state. This is visible in the variable coincidence of 
different boundaries, borders or frontiers of action and the changing primacy of 
different scales of political action. This involves in turn various multi-spatial 
government and governance arrangements. It also invites reflection on whether the 
three Ps denote and connote the same in foreign, trans-, supra- or inter-national 
politics as they do in the sphere of domestic, internal politics. 
Likewise, from a governmentality perspective, Foucault notes: 
 
it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this 
governmentality that is at the same time both external and internal to the 
state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of 
what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and 
what private, what is and what is not within the state’s competence, and so 
on. So, if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on 
the basis of the general tactics of governmentality (2008: 109). 
 
This poses important issues of statecraft understood not just as the exercise of 
sovereign power (its conventional referent) but as the complex art of ‘governance of 
governance’ within and beyond the (changing) formal boundaries of the state. 
Foucauldian scholars study problem-definition, power asymmetries, domination and 
the political effects of specific modes of calculation, institutional assemblages, and 
social practices. A key aspect of governmentality is how it (re-)defines some issues 
as private, technical or managerial, removing them from overtly political decision-
making and contentious politics (Miller and Rose 2008). Repoliticization could also 
be seen in terms of governmentality. 
 




the general notion of the State includes elements which need to be referred 
back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that the 
State = ‘political society + civil society’, in other words, hegemony armoured 
with coercion’) (1971: 263). 
 
Gramsci studied the state as a complex social relation that articulates state and non-
state institutions and practices around particular economic, political, and societal 
projects and strategies. He emphasized the centrality of private institutions, 
organizations, and movements in state power, the formation of political alliances, 
and disorganization of subaltern forces. ‘Civil society’, a domain of ostensibly 
‘private’ associations, was an integral part of the state and, a fortiori, of politics and 
policy. This insight has been extended to ‘global civil society’ and its role as a vector 
of de- and re-politicization in global governance practices such as development aid. 
 
Combining Foucauldian and Gramscian perspectives, and mindful of Mitchell’s 
remark that the essence of modern politics is the reproduction of the inherently 
flexible boundary between state and society, I suggest that ‘the state in its inclusive 
sense’ can be defined as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. 
Thus the exercise of state power involves both state capacities unique to the state 
(e.g., its constitutionalized monopoly of organized coercion, tax powers, and legal 
sovereignty); and modes of governance or governmentalization that operate beyond 
the state. Government and governance are often linked through contested practices 
of collibration, i.e., the rebalancing of forms of governance both within and beyond 
the state. Such practices involve not only specific political and/or policy outcomes in 
particular political and policy fields but also their broader effects on state capacities. 
They modify the available mix of government and governance techniques and 
change the balance of forces. Those engaged in metagovernance may redraw the 
inherited public-private divide, alter the forms of interpenetration between the political 
system and other functional systems, and modify the relations between these 
systems and civil society in the light of their (perceived) impact on state capacities. 
While collibration is one of the state’s main meta-political activities, an activity where 
it has a privileged strategic position, it is often hotly contested because of competing 
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meta-governance projects. And, as neoliberalism indicates, these projects can 
originate outside the state, even if state action is needed to realize them. 
 
For the polity, then, a key aspect of re- and de-politicization is the redrawing of the 
'lines of difference' between the political and one or more ostensibly non-political 
spheres – whether the latter are defined as an unmarked residuum in terms of their 
location outside the political sphere (e.g., state vs society, public vs private) or as 
marked spheres with their own institutional order, operational logics, subjects, and 
practices (e.g., the religious, economic, legal, educational, or scientific fields). Thus 
politicization extends the frontiers of the polity (penetrating or colonizing the non-
political as an unmarked sphere or one or more marked spheres and subordinating 
it/them to political factors, interests, values, and forces), depoliticization rolls these 
frontiers back, and repoliticization reintegrates depoliticized spheres into the political. 
 
For terminological clarity, in line with the three Ps, we can describe these processes 
in terms of politization. This involves constructing a division between the political and 
non-political spheres and locating social relations and/or sets of social issues on one 
or another side of this divide. This creates space for various kinds of depolitization, 
e.g., sacralization, marketization, juridification, scientization (expertise) or, in 
Foucauldian terms, governmentalization and self-responsibilization through 
disciplinary or governmental practices. However, as Mitchell, Foucault, and Gramsci, 
in their different ways, emphasize, this dividing line is not natural, even if it is 
sometimes taken-for-granted: it must be policed and can be repoliticized. Thus 
depolitization would backfire if it provokes controversies and contention about the 
demarcation of the political and non-political spheres and what properly belongs on 
the unmarked side or in a given, positively demarcated, non-political sphere. 
 
A secondary aspect of depolitization is the reorganization of the division of political 
labour within the polity. This can occur through institutional differentiation, 
dedifferentiation, adding new tiers or scales, or moving particular topics across its 
branches and departments. The ‘normal’ forms of politics vary across branches of 
government: for example, partisan and adversarial politics in legislatures, concern 
with the ‘national interest’ – if only as a legitimation – in the political executive, 
rational-legal administration in bureaucracies, formal legal reasoning in courts, and 
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constitutional interpretation in supreme courts. The resulting checks and balances 
and countervailing powers may contribute to depoliticalization by setting limits to 
politics as the art of the possible and/or introducing frictions and delays into the 
political process when major changes are sought. These very checks and balances 
can also be means of overt or covert politicalization. This can occur when 
administrative or judicial offices or key positions on quangos are allocated through a 
spoils system or, again, when bureaucrats do not act as good, Weberian officials 
sine ira et studio (without anger or enthusiasm) but have their own personal, 
partisan, or sectional political agendas (Peters and Pierre 2004). Likewise, for 
regulators, the co-production of regulation with input from the regulated can create 
regulatory capture or willing submission to sectors that might offer lucrative future 
employment.  
 
More generally, moving issues across branches can change the form of politics, 
involving both de- and re-politicization, diminishing the significance of the prior form 
and boosting the importance of the stakes and practices associated with the branch 
to which deliberative and/or decision-making powers are transferred. Jumping scale 
can also produce politicization if it removes issues from a contentious to non-
contentious arena or, at least, one where the stakes and balance of forces are 
different. Overall, this secondary aspect, in its various guises, sometimes involves 
politization of previously non-political spheres (e.g., education, gender relations, 
science), sometimes re-allocates political responsibilities across government 
branches, and sometimes shifts their scale (e.g., from local to national to trans- or 
supra-national). Adjusting the polity’s variable geometry need not modify the forms of 
politics but may simply alter its forms, terrains, or temporal horizons. 
 
A key issue here is the territorialization of political power. If statehood is defined in 
part in territorial terms (as many traditional state theories claim), then depoliticization 
can refer to destatization and/or depolitization. The former removes issues from the 
purview of a territorial state – whether in the guise of electoral politics, legislative 
deliberation, executive decision, bureaucratic administration, or judicial determination 
– and moves them into an ill-defined political sphere where ‘stakeholders’ or ‘social 
partners’ deliberate and negotiate about societal steering in areas of mutual interest. 
This preserves a space for ‘politics without (official) policy-making’. Destatization is 
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also described as a movement from government to governance. This trend may 
reflect demands by social forces dissatisfied with state and market failure and/or 
initiatives by state managers to supplement or replace more traditional forms of top-
down government to better serve relevant ‘publics’. In this sense, governance 
straddles the conventional public-private divide and may involve 'tangled 
hierarchies', parallel power networks, or other linkages across tiers of government 
and/or functional domains. However, just as markets and the state fail in their own 
ways, governance networks have their forms of failure. This opens space for the re-
entry of the state as a political subject charged with meta-governance 
responsibilities. However meta-governance is also failure-prone, thanks to the 
‘wicked complexity’ of some governance problems and the inevitable triple 
politicization of the state qua institutionally-mediated material condensation of a 
shifting balance of forces (Meuleman 2008; Jessop 2011). 
 
Depoliticalization and Politics 
 
If politics refers to formally instituted, organized or informal practices that are directly 
oriented to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power, then politicization refers 
to the thematization of some issues as appropriate topics for state action. In general 
terms, politics refers to the forms, aims, and objects of political practice. It includes 
contention over the institutional architecture of the state and political sphere and 
struggles at a distance from the state that modify political calculation and/or views on 
the nature and purposes of state power. Important here is Poulantzas’s point that the 
state’s particular functions – techno-economic, narrowly political (i.e., concerned with 
reproducing the state apparatus and its institutional unity), and ideological or ethico-
political – are all exercised in the light of its general task to maintain social cohesion 
in a class- and otherwise-divided society (Poulantzas 1973). Depoliticization in all 
three senses is crucial to these efforts to maintain social cohesion. 
 
For clarity, we could refer to depoliticization in regard to politics as depoliticalization. 
However, whereas the polity provides a rather static, spatial referent, politics is an 
inherently dynamic, open-ended, and heterogeneous ensemble of political practices. 
Thus depoliticalization has several meanings. Relevant issues concern: (1) the forms 
and stakes of normal and/or exceptional politics; (2) the thematization of issues as 
10 
 
controversial, negotiable, or consensual; (3) the subjective identity as well as 
material and ideal interests of political agents; (4) their location within, on the 
margins of, or at a distance from the state’s institutional architecture; and (5) their 
positioning relative to the front- or back-stage of the political scene. Because space 
constraints prohibit an extended list of relevant dimensions of depoliticalization, I will 
provide five different examples. 
 
First, if one regarded class interests as the key stake in politics, an important mode 
of depoliticalization would maintaining the separation between an economy 
subordinate to the logic of profit-oriented, market-mediated accumulation and a 
political sphere that makes decisions about the national or national-popular interest. 
For this dethematizes antagonistic class interests and disorganizes class forces in 
favour of negotiable interests rooted in economic-corporate or non-class interests. 
This requires, as Marx noted for an earlier period, a specific compromise. Subaltern 
classes should not advance from political to social emancipation; conversely, the 
dominant classes should not seek to return to the political status quo ante by 
restoring the Ancien Régime but be content that their social power has been restored 
(1978: 77). More generally, stable liberal bourgeois democratic politics depends on 
the self-limitation of what political forces thematize as political. If this institutionalized, 
depoliticalizing social compromise breaks down, there is the legal or factual 
possibility of declaring a state of economic or political emergency, suspending the 
rule of law, and limiting the forms, forums, spaces, and methods for expressing 
political resistance. In these conditions, the alleged demands of national security 
and/or economic recovery take precedence over ‘normal’ democratic politics. For 
national security, this can take a police-military form (military dictatorship), one-party 
rule (e.g., fascism), a government of national unity (suspending normal party 
politics), or multi-party support for emergency measures taken by the incumbent 
government. For economic crisis, we observe governments of national unity, rule by 
‘technocrats’ (e.g., Spain and Greece in the Eurozone debt crisis), and externally-
imposed economic, financial, and fiscal measures as the quid pro quo for outside 
assistance. 
 
States of emergency also provide cover for open or covert action to weaken various 
political forces that oppose crisis-induced or, at least, crisis-legitimated policies. In 
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addition to the recent neoliberal exploitation of crisis to cut entitlements (rather than, 
say, defense expenditure), this opportunity was taken in the handling of the Occupy 
Wall Street movement and its offshoots elsewhere, where measures were taken to 
delegitimate it, treat it as a terrorist organization, arrest its leaders, disrupt its 
activities, and block supportive media coverage. Notwithstanding such treatment, 
Occupy succeeded in politicizing the management of the financial crisis and 
popularizing the issue of growing inequality around the populist slogan of the 99% 
against the one per cent (for analysis of the Occupy movement and its role as a 
‘constituent moment’ in US politics, see Tarrow 2011, Chomsky 2012, Gitlin 2012). 
 
Second, and relatedly, the self-limitation of democratic politics can also be secured 
through constitutional law, which depoliticalizes the economic, political and social 
interests that were dominant at the inevitably highly politicized conjuncture in which a 
constitution is established and also consolidates this material condensation of the 
balance of forces by requiring special procedures to alter the now depoliticalized 
constitution. The separation of powers and guarantees of fundamental political, 
economic, and social rights contribute to this depoliticalization and, once the 
constitution has been taken-for-granted, it is hard to contest the strategic biases 
inscribed in this separation and in the specific content of fundamental rights. This is 
seen in the granting of significant autonomy to central banks to set interest-rate and 
exchange-rate policy within market constraints (mediated via forecasting based on 
neoclassical models, bond markets, credit-rating agencies, and so on) rather than 
being subject to overtly political pressures, whether from government, parties, social 
partners, or social movements. Analogously, a ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill 1995) is 
creating super-protection for capital as neoliberalism is rolled out globally. This is 
seen in the re-scaling of quasi-constitutional protections for capitalist enterprises and 
their activities to the international level (removing them from the more contentious 
field of national politics) and the allocation of adjudication over disputes (including 
with states) to private tribunals, experts, lawyers, and other ostensibly non-political 
forums and/or figures. 
 
Third, more modestly but sometimes as effectively, when the goal is to depoliticalize 
a political issue, state managers or other political agents may seek information, 
policy recommendations, or even decisions from ostensibly non-political figures 
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(recruited from ‘civil society’), retired politicians, elder statesmen and stateswomen, 
technocrats, allegedly bi- or multi-partisan commissions, or quasi-non-governmental 
organizations. Whether or not figures are considered ‘above politics’ depends, of 
course, on whether or not the politics-non-politics divide is accepted. One benefit of 
this tactic is that it can create cooling-off periods for controversial decisions. This is 
why the role of commissions of inquiry is sometimes described as taking minutes 
and lasting years. Corporatist arrangements may also serve to depoliticalize issues. 
They were often introduced to address long-term economic and social issues where 
complex, reciprocal interdependence requires long-term cooperation – thereby 
placing the relevant policy areas outside the short-term time horizons of electoral 
cycles and parliamentary in-fighting in the expectation (whether cognitive or 
normative) that the organizations involved (or at least their leaders) would act in 
‘non-political’ ways to implement policies in the ‘national interest’ (e.g., wage restraint 
in the case of tripartite bodies). And, most recently, public-private partnership 
arrangements have been established to deliver policies in an efficient, effective, and 
economical manner (e.g., private health trusts, or charter schools as a case of 
public-private partnerships) and ostensibly (but not genuinely) free from state 
interference. 
 
Fourth, depoliticalization can be fostered through governmentalization, i.e., creating 
the conditions for technocratic decision-making and/or the self-responsibilization of 
individuals, groups, organizations, or whole ‘stakeholder groups’ through adoption of 
specific technologies of government that rely on scientific expertise, consultants, 
expert systems, algorithms, metrology, ratings, bench-marking, contingent rewards 
for approved behaviour, and so on (on expertise, see Fischer 2009; on metrology, 
Barry 2002; on credit rating agencies, Sinclair 2005; on governmentalization, Miller 
and Rose 2008). These techniques are sometimes justified in terms of reducing 
government overload but they also have affinities with the neoliberal project of a lean 
state, which depends on flanking and supporting mechanisms to smooth the political 
sting of austerity politics (on the rollback, rollout, and blowback phases of 
neoliberalism, see Peck 2010). This approach can be read as a form of ‘passive 
revolution’: a process of transformation, absorption, and incorporation that translates 
contentious issues into bureaucratic or technical questions (Gramsci 1971: 115, 
291). It aims to enhance the efficiencies of economic, political, and social domination 
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via micro-management that penetrates the pores of an increasingly complex and 
intransparent social formation. It may also turn potential sources of resistance or 
obstruction into self-responsibilized agents of their own subordination. Although they 
would reject the Gramscian gloss given to these practices, Anglo-Foucauldian 
scholars and those interested in social studies of science have provided many 
examples (cf. Barry 2002; Miller and Rose 2008). 
 
Fifth, following Husserl and Heidegger, we can refer to ‘sedimentation’ as a more 
semantic mode of depoliticalization that also applies to policies. This covers all forms 
of routinization that lead to a forgetting of the contested origins of political 
discourses, structures and processes. This gives them the form and appearance of 
objective facts of life. Building on this phenomenological claim, two critical discourse 
analysts have posited a cyclical logic that moves from politicization to sedimentation 
(depoliticization) to repoliticization as the contested origins of the taken-for-granted 
are exposed and a new round of contestation begins. Seen thus, repoliticization is a 
form of politicalization that refers to all forms of challenge to such objectivation, 
aiming to denaturalize the semiotic and material (extra-semiotic) features of what 
has become sedimented. Sedimentation and depoliticization are not confined to a 
specific ‘political’ domain (separate from others, however differentiated); they are 
contingent aspects of all forms of social life (Glynos and Howarth 2007). This thesis 
risks a latent pan-politicism avoidable only by stressing the discontinuous rhythms of 
alternating phases of sedimentation and (re-)politicization. This would highlight the 
shifting frontiers of the polity, the sedimentation and repoliticization of various 
features of the social world as accepted facts of life or as ripe for political action, and, 








































Table 1. Modes of De- and Re-Politicization 
























world of states 
 
 
Primary mode: drawing 
and redrawing lines of 
demarcation between the 
polity and its other(s) 
 
Secondary: relocating 
functions and tasks in a 
given polity (e.g., forum 
shifting, rescaling, de- and 
reterritorialization) to alter 
the forms and stakes of 




The always contingent 
separation of the political from 
non-political sphere implies there 
are constitutive outside(s) 
(unmarked or marked) as a 
precondition of political practice 
 
The political sphere is never 
completely closed because 
political struggles overflow its 
boundaries and because its 
operations are materially 
interdependent with those of 
various non-political spheres 
 
Self-limitation on redrawing lines 
of demarcation and redesigning 
the political sphere occurs via 
(temporarily depoliticalized) 
constitutions that paradoxically 
provide for their own suspension 
or transformation. 
 
Key strategic questions: who has 
the right to declare a state of 
emergency; and which forces, if 
any, have the power to demand, 

















stage of the 
political scene 
 
Primary mode: defining 
some problems or issues 
as proper, others as 
improper, themes of 
political mobilization. NB: 
identifying and naming 
them is itself a political act 
 
Politics depends on separation 
between front and back-stages 
of politics. This enables 
movement between open and 
covert political action as one 
form of re- and de-politicalization 
 
 
Mutual self-restraint as a 
precondition for an agonistic 
politics versus contingent 
political benefits of 
controversialization, polarization, 















Secondary modes: wide 
range of ways to steer 
inherently open-ended, 
contingent subjects and 
objects of antagonistic 
and/or agonistic politics 
 
Political forces cannot deal with 
all conceivable political issues in 
same place-time: issues must be 
allocated to diverse political 
spaces with different capacities 
and/or prioritized and 
sequenced. Intended or not, this 
is an inherently political process. 
 
Oriented to the impossible 
reconciliation of particular 
interests with the general 
interest: this depends on 
hegemonic practices that 
necessarily exclude some 
particular interests and that are 


















as sites of 










Primary mode: construing 
problems or issues as 
proper (or improper) 
targets of official policy 
and, given this, seeking to 
shape, implement, or block 
these policies 
 
Secondary modes: wide 
range of ways to shape 
policy-making, from 
framing issues as political 





Decision-making includes the 
decision not to make a decision 
(non-decision-making). 
 
Policy-making includes not 
having a policy, i.e., policy of 
indifference.  
 
Benign indifference expands 
realm of freedom for exercise of 
legal, political, and social rights 
without harming others. Malign 
indifference ignores crisis-
tendencies and negative 
externalities (harms) that result 
from unregulated systems 
 
 
Policies have particular manifest 
and/or latent substantive and 
symbolic aims but are also 
typically formed, adopted, or 
modified in the light of their 
implications for overall balance 
of forces and societal cohesion 
 
Limiting politics to restricted 
choice of policies (ignoring the 
ties of policy problems to wider 
structural or strategic problems, 
including basic contradictions or 
potential blowbacks) can 
politicalize and politicize them – 




Depoliticization and policy 
 
Whereas politics concerns the overall strategic direction of the state and its ‘division 
of policy labour’, policy denotes specific fields of state intervention and abstention, 
decisions and non-decisions, modes of intervention, and so on. Their depoliticization 
occurs in the context of the results of earlier depolitization and depoliticalization. In 
particular, many of the modes for removing issues from open political contention can 
also be found in the formation of specific policies, policy-making, policy-taking, and 
policy-implementation. Sedimentation is a key mechanism here because it removes 
many taken-for-granted themes from the political field, from the scope of contentious 
politics, or from policy considerations. Supplementing this is thematization of some 
issues as non-political and some policies as non-negotiable. Conversely, and 
paradoxically, the highlighting of a restricted set of policy choices can also produce 
depoliticalization. As Wolff (2010) noted for the early stages of the North Atlantic 
Financial Crisis, if political debate focuses on a restricted choice of policies, it implies 
that the crisis (or other problems) are due to previous poor policy choices. The 
problem then becomes to identify the correct policy and this diverts attention from 
broader issues of governability, continuing contradictions, and so on. 
 
Politics and Economics in the North Atlantic Financial Crisis 
 
Space constraints prevent a detailed analysis of the genesis, aetiology, and course 
of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (hereafter NAFC). Instead I discuss two cases 
of depoliticization to hint at some interrelations of the three levels of depoliticization 
and their limitations. The NAFC comprises a complex nexus of crises with 
technological, economic, financial, political, geo-political, social, and environmental 
aspects. Nonetheless its label is justified because it was triggered by accumulating 
problems generated by a hypertrophied finance-dominated economy in which 
fictitious money, fictitious credit, fictitious capital (and, increasingly, fictitious profits 
derived from control fraud) played an increasingly autonomous role outside the 
circuits of profit-producing capital. This was facilitated by four decades of 
neoliberalism that had depolitized monetary policy, interest rate policy, and 
regulatory policy by making central banks independent of direct government control 
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and extending neoliberal policies that all point in the direction of depoliticization 
(Jessop 2013). 
 
The typical neoliberal policy set comprises: (1) liberalization to promote greater 
market competition; (2) deregulation, based on belief in the efficiency of markets and 
the prudential, self-preserving instincts of companies and financial institutions; (3) 
privatization to roll back the frontiers of the polity in favour of the profit-oriented, 
market-mediated economy; (4) the introduction of market proxies in the residual 
state sector to favour efficient, effective, and economical delivery of public services, 
thereby reducing the scope for non-market logics in the public sector, especially 
when combined with budget cuts; (5) reductions in direct taxation on corporate 
income, personal wealth, and personal income – especially on entrepreneurial 
income – in order to encourage innovation and allow market forces rather than the 
state to determine national output; and (6) promoting internationalization to boost the 
free flow of goods and services, profit-producing investment, and interest-bearing 
capital and assist completion of the world market. 
 
Each of these measures involves a paradoxical form of depolitization. They involve 
active state intervention to reset the boundaries between the political and the non-
political. In this case, however, the latter is not an unmarked residual (society) but a 
deliberately expanded marked sphere (profit-oriented, market-mediated economic 
activities). Another paradox, often remarked but always explicit in the Freiburg rather 
than Chicago version of neoliberalism, is the coupling of an expanded ‘free market’ 
with a ‘strong state’. Ordo-liberalism would interpret the latter more in terms of robust 
regulation of market forces and a lean but solidaristic welfare state. In contrast, for 
the Chicago School, the strong state involves weak regulation for capital, a mean 
social security state, and a growing domestic security apparatus to pre-empt, control 
and punish dissent. Moreover, whenever the naïve belief in the principle of efficient 
markets is confounded by experience, neoliberals pragmatically endorse a state of 
economic emergency that authorizes state action and the creation of fiat money, 
issuing of public debt, or resort to more technical manoeuvres to rescue financial 
institutions deemed too big and/or too systemically interconnected to be permitted to 
fail or, indeed, simply too well-connected to be required to fail. In short, policies 
recently deemed improper and even reckless and, therefore, beyond the politically 
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acceptable repertoire of government action are redefined as essential to the national 
and, indeed, global interest in ‘timely, targeted, and temporary’ (but by no means 
token) measures to recapitalize failing financial institutions, renewing business 
confidence, and restore capital accumulation. 
 
The Fiscal Cliff Debate 
 
The USA is the economic and political space where conditions favouring a severe 
financial crisis were nurtured (albeit not with this result in mind) and where it 
surfaced, initially unremarked on the political stage, then occupying centre-stage 
(Rasmus 2010, 2012). The US crisis passed through stages: credit crunch, liquidity 
crisis, some financial insolvencies, a generalized financial crisis, a recession that 
risked becoming an epic recession or even great depression, and, most recently, a 
‘public debt’ crisis. The associated shifts in crisis-management and the symptoms of 
a ‘crisis of crisis-management’ (Offe 1984) exemplify the paradox of a political 
stagecraft that manufactures crises or controversy around some issues and thereby 
diverts political attention from other, perhaps more fundamental, themes, problems 
and crises (which are depoliticalized by default). 
 
The roll-out phase of neo-liberalism contributed in this regard to the depolitization of 
economic processes and policy decisions that were once vital to the state’s capacity 
to govern the capitalist economy. Two examples are: (1) the deregulation of banking 
and finance, because, allegedly, rational economic actors would always act 
prudently; and (2) official indifference to growing private debt even though this 
eventually contributed more to the U.S. financial crisis than the supposed evil of 
growing public debt (cutting which intensifies the economic crisis when private debt 
is already being deleveraged). Example two is entwined with the depoliticalization of 
key parts of the federal budget, namely, defence plus subsidies and tax-breaks for 
the corporate sector, such that mainstream political debate and mass media 
comment focus on the neoliberal bête noire of entitlement programmes. 
 
These features of the political scene shaped the surreal fiscal cliff debate. This 
rested on cumulative and wide-ranging efforts over decades to restrict the policy 
options so that the need for entitlement reductions to lower public spending was 
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naturalized. It also saw a political theatre around discussion of these limited options 
following the visible economic fear and political panic in November 2008. The fiscal 
cliff drama began its two-year run in 2011, produced by business lobbies, directed by 
fiscal hawks, and favourably reviewed by mainstream media. The script gave a key 
role in depoliticalization to an official commission. The leading players in the 
bicameral, bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the 
Bowles-Simpson Commission) were recruited on both sides from known deficit 
hawks. Unsurprisingly, its blueprint for deficit reduction stoked the fiscal hysteria 
without ever seriously examining cuts in defence spending, ending unfunded wars, 
halting subsidies to a broad spectrum of corporate interests (often with large 
reserves, often held offshore), or restoring tax rates on the rich to Reagan era levels, 
even though wages have stagnated for 20-plus years and wealth inequalities match 
those of the roaring ‘twenties. Although it did not achieve the internal votes needed 
to become an official report (in part because some members deemed it insufficiently 
radical), the blueprint fed into a carefully stage-managed drama on the well-
illuminated political stage that focused on deficits and later used the widely accepted 
metaphor of ‘fiscal cliff’ to frame public debate. Meanwhile, back-stage dealings and 
plotting continued with a view to cutting entitlement programmes further and 
implementing yet more corporate tax breaks. The benefits for the rich of the latter will 
substantially exceed the ‘harm’ caused by individual tax hikes. 
 
The spurious debate on the ‘fiscal cliff’ reveals an odd but powerful combination of: 
 
(1) The sedimented depolitization of a crisis-prone, deregulated, profit-oriented, 
market-mediated economy that is regarded as the only economic option (with all 
of its implications for the scope of normal politics); 
 
(2) political theatricalization of an adversarial play at the front of the political 
stage, which is applauded by a complicit mass media that has largely adopted 
unquestioningly the wilfully misleading fiscal cliff narrative, which serves the 
political occultation (depoliticalization) of the actions of a bipartisan parallel 
power network, representing the dominant fractions of capital, that has worked 
behind the scenes to facilitate cuts in entitlement programmes, roll-back the 
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residual welfare state, and extend more tax benefits to big corporations and the 
richest individuals and families. 
 
(3) the depoliticization of mainstream debate on the fiscal crisis by confining it to 
policy choices favoured by interest-bearing capital and transnational profit-
producing capital, which are less likely to prevent a triple dip recession or great 
depression than the excluded options, rather than considering other, feasible 
policy options that might regenerate the economy, enhance competitiveness, 
improve conditions for the ‘squeezed middle’, and renew the war on poverty. 
 
Depoliticization is enabled because state managers and those close to the state’s 
inner sancta do not contest the ‘free market’ ideology of neo-liberalism. Even the 
Obama Administration, with its strong electoral mandate(s) for change and the 
potential political resource of public anger, rejected a popular, populist attack on 
‘banksters’, bailed out financial institutions, and pursued fiscal austerity to protect 
corporate tax cuts and defence spending. With many dramatis personae recruited 
from the financial sector (notably from investment banks), the Obama Administration 
followed the fiscal cliff script, contributing to bipartisan and bicameral immobilism. 
The last minute enactment, on 2 January 2013, of modest tax hikes and deeper 
spending cuts allowed the federal government to maintain normal operations 
temporarily, setting the scene for renewed negotiations with higher economic and 
political stakes as the sequester approached. Yet the borrowing limit imposed on the 
Treasury that provides the background to this drama does not derive from the 
Constitution but is a recent convention promoted by fiscal conservatives and now so 
thoroughly depoliticalized that leading economic and  political forces and the 
mainstream media accept it as the basis for the high-stakes fiscal debate. 
 
Following political deadlock, Budget Control Act (2011) provisions triggered 
sequestration cuts of 10 per cent on 1 March 2013. Despite earlier doom-laden 
forecasts, the US economy is slowly recovering (although commentators doubt its 
robustness) and, more significantly, the federal budget deficit is falling, contrary to 
deficit scare-mongering. This suggests that the deficit hysteria was staged to 
pressure Congress in an election period to lock in bigger cuts before quantitative 
easing produced a (weak) recovery and that Obama collaborated for his own political 
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ends. His proposed budget for 2014 (for approval in September 2013) confirms the 
obfuscated Obama-Republican remit to maintain the Bush tax cuts and defence 
spending at the expense of reducing Medicare and Medicaid (rejecting a modest 
payroll tax increase to cover prescription drugs or acting to limit their escalating, 
monopolistic pricing), cutting other discretionary social spending, and postponing 
pensions and reducing their real value. This is a major success for strategies of 
removing key issues from the political agenda. 
 
The Eurozone Crisis and the Fiscal Compact 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis (or Eurozone crisis) that became visible in 2008-
9 and intensified in 2009-12 led via a series of failed crisis-measures to the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (or 
Fiscal Compact) signed by all but two member states in March 2012. When fully 
implemented, it will set binding limits (0.5 per cent of GDP) on the structural deficits 
in the annual budgets of individual member-states and thereby constrain national 
sovereignty in the field of economic policy. This illustrates another set of political 
strategies for depolitization, depoliticalization, and depoliticization. 
 
Depolitization occurred stepwise during the formation of the European Union as 
powers were transferred to the executive at national and federal level and, notably, 
scale-jumping and arena-shifting moved crucial economic and financial powers to 
the European Commission with its close ties to economic and financial interests and 
well-known ‘democratic deficit’. This trend was reinforced with the founding of 
Economic and Monetary Union and a European Central Bank, which, while formally 
accountable to member-states, is independent of democratic political control and 
concerned primarily with price stability rather than wider economic issues. 
 
The Fiscal Compact continues this approach (including its neglect of public opinion) 
by removing budgetary policy from national control, establishing technical rules set 
by experts and premised on theoretically-flawed neoclassical economic reasoning, 
and triggering sanctions if the limits are broken. Precedents for this debt brake 
include Switzerland (2001-) and Germany (2009-), although these show that it is 
hard to measure structural deficits, operate the brake, and avoid political 
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manipulation. Scientific validity and technical feasibility issues apart, this measure 
will prevent active fiscal policy along Keynesian lines. By extending disciplinary 
neoliberalism, it constitutionalizes and entrenches the power of capital, limiting 
states’ political autonomy and transforming budget-making into a more technocratic 
process subject to legal sanctions as well as market pressures. 
 
Depoliticalization was reinforced by the transformation of the unexpected (in official 
circles) financial crisis into several sovereign debt crises and contagion risks rooted 
in deeply interconnected European credit markets. This created the space for 
technocratic governance in southern member states, whether through EU and ECB-
inspired coups d’état (Greece and Italy) or through de facto or formal governments of 
national unity (Spain, Portugal). These governments are running states of economic 
emergency that authorize big spending cuts and neoliberal structural reforms. Yet 
the depth of the crisis and the impact of austerity have prompted growing resistance 
in the periphery from the unemployed, the poor, the marginalized, savers, etc., with a 
likely spread northwards. This requires careful modulation of conditionalities to keep 
the electorates of ‘donor’ states on side and to temper popular unrest that would 
destabilize the governments of economic emergency in the indebted states. Yet this 
tends to hide from public view that bailout monies largely return from the PIIGS to 
financial institutions in Northern Europe. 
 
Depoliticization depends on the TINA (There is No Alternative) mantra that delimits 
the feasible set of economic, political, and social policies. This proved unappealing in 
Southern Europe (outside the current set of state managers) and is contested by 
post-Keynesian economists, diverse think tanks, and several major political parties 
when in opposition. The tipping of the Eurozone into a deepening double dip 
recession, which has triggered second thoughts in the International Monetary Fund 
and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, growing popular 
unrest, including right-wing populist reaction and xenophobia, and popular reaction 
against the European Central Bank attempt to renege on deposit insurance in 
Cyprus all indicate the limits of depoliticization even when depolitization is still firmly 
entrenched. This suggests that the validity of Deutsch’s dictum (1963: 111) that 
power means not having to learn from one’s mistakes may vary across polity, 





I identified three levels of politics and linked them to different modes of politicization, 
depoliticization, and repoliticization. Given this issue’s focus, my remarks largely 
addressed depolitization, depoliticalization, and depoliticization, which correspond 
respectively to efforts and/or outcomes that (1) reconfigure the space of politics (the 
polity) to the benefit of its unmarked ‘other’ (society) or specific marked spheres 
(notably the profit-oriented, market-mediated economy); (2) change the sites and 
stakes of political practices (the field of politics); and (3) thematize some issues as 
inappropriate for political policy-making.  
With consolidated neoliberal regime shifts or, at least, the ratchet-like advance of 
neoliberal policy adjustments in the last 30-40 years and the recent imposition of 
neoliberal conditionalities on the indebted PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Spain) economies, all three forms of depoliticization have favoured economic 
neoliberalism nolens volens by redrawing the boundaries, limiting the stakes, and 
restricting the allegedly feasible set of policy choices in the political field. This 
extends capital accumulation as an organizational principle towards the expanding 
horizon of the world market and world society. 
This modifies the line between the polity and its other(s), the nature and purpose of 
politics, and the policies that are acceptable and feasible vis-à-vis the problem-
generating capacity of a self-expanding economic sphere. The extension of real and 
proxy markets; of commodification; the fictitious commodification of nature, labour-
power, money and credit, and knowledge; liberalization and regulation aimed at 
market completion; and lower taxation – all these render the political sphere 
indifferent to market outcomes, removing decisions and actions with major societal 
repercussions from a public domain where they can be subject to contingent, 
contentious, and contested political practices. This was already inscribed in the 
institutional separation between the market economy and the state, with only the 




It is tempting to focus on the aims of the social forces seeking to transform the polity, 
modify political practices, and pursue some rather than other policies. But this would 
mean neglecting the adequacy of their political, non-political, or apolitical construals 
to the social and material challenges that these forces seek to resolve. There are 
basic contradictions and crisis-tendencies that are incompressible and do not 
disappear simply because handling them is no longer deemed to fall within the 
political sphere, to be a proper theme of political practices, or to belong to a 
legitimate range of policies. As Poulantzas argued, whether or not the state 
intervenes, the contradictions of capitalism are inescapable (1978: 167-172). This 
gains credence from the eventual outbreak of the crisis of regulated, finance-
dominated accumulation manifest in the NAFC, forcing the re-politicization of the 
market economy, the re-thematization of economic issues as appropriate objects of 
political practice, and active policy making rather than studied indifference. 
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